I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1970's, a growing number of newspaper and broadcast journalists' have suddenly become celebrities in a way that none of them could have wished. Reporters such as William Farr, Peter Bridge, and most recently, Myron Farber, have become famous-because they have gone to jail. These persons arejournalists who were ordered by courts to identify confidential sources of information. All declined to do so, and for their refusal, were ordered punished for contempt.
These reporters went to jail in the name of a principle-but it is a principle whose constitutional foundation has never been explicitly sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States.
2 This principle, often claimed but sometimes rejected, is known as the newsman's privilege. It is the right claimed byjouirnalists to refuse to testify, or otherwise supply information, in judicial, legislative, or administrative pioceedings, about their confidential news sources or confidential knowledge obtained in the course of news gathering. Proponents of the privilege have claimed, at differing times, that it is derived from the common law, the first or fifth amendments to the United States Constitution, or various state statutes. Branzburg v. Hayes, 5 decided June 29, 1972, is the Supreme Court's only comprehensive examination of the subject. The five-to-four decision, authored by Mr. Justice White, opened with this unequivo-'The terms journalist, newsman, reporter, and the press will 6e utilized interchangeably in this comment. The question of just who is a journalist is one that has troubled both courts dealing with privilege claims and legislatures trying to formulate adequate shield laws. In this comment, the terms mean those persons directly involved in the processes of gathering, researching, writing, editing, photographing, illustrating, reporting, analyzing, commenting on, or broadcasting information for public consumption through media of mass communication and dissemination of news. These media would include newspapers, magazines, other periodicals, wire services, news or feature syndicates, radio, television, and broadcasting networks.
2 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 3 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
cal declaration: "The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before federal and state grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not." 4 Despite these strong words, however, the Court's opinion left considerable room for uncertainty and conflicting interpretation. Different judges, later ruling on privilege claims in other cases, came to diametrically dissimilar conclusions-all citing Branzburg as the authority for their decisions.a
The case that once again has kindled national interest in this issue is In re Farber, 6 the celebrated 1978 decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, which held that any newsman's privilege must yield to the constitutional rights of a defendant in a criminal prosecution. Although the United States Supreme Court did not choose to take certiorari in the case, 7 In re Farber still must be regarded as a significant decision, not because it attracted nationwide attention, but because its holding adopts a more inimical stance toward immunity for journalists than most other courts have taken in recent years. The Farber decision already has been cited by other judges, 8 and it raises important questions about the future of this issue in the courts.
The primary purpose of this comment will be to examine the application of the privilege doctrine in criminal cases and grand jury testimony, and the result in Farber will be contrasted with other recent decisions in the area. The history of the newsman's privilege issue and the sources of the doctrine will be outlined initially, followed by a review of the Supreme Court's holding in Branzburg and of those cases, both civil and criminal, that have been decided in the years since Branwburg. The comment will next examine the Farber decision itself, including both the complex procedural development of the case and the four opinions authored by members of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Finally, the comment will analyze the Farber decision and other lower court criminal law/newsman's privilege cases, and will suggest alternatives for judicial resolution of the controversy.
II. THE CENTRAL ISSUE
The conflict at issue here is a clash between two vital guarantees of the United States Constitution-the right of free press 9 and the right to just and orderly judicial process.' 0 It is impossible for the two systems protected by these constitutional guarantees to operate simultaneously under conditions of absolute freedom, as cases like Branzburg and Farber clearly demonstrate. Society must thus make choices: either one of the systems must be permitted to function at a level of maximum efficiency, with a resulting loss in the flexibility and freedom of the other, or a balance must be struck between the two absolutes. In reality, of course, there are, and always have been, a variety of constraints upon both the free press and the judicial process. The common law of libel and obscenity and the "clear and present danger" 11 and "fighting words"' 2 doctrines are exUnited States v. Digilio, No. 74-313 (D.N.J. 1978 ) (magistrate's opinion, unreported) and In re Powers, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1600 (Vt. Dist. Ct. 1978) . Mr. Justice White's opinion refusing to grant a stay in the Farber case, New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 6 (1978) , was cited in New York v. Zagarino, 4 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1693 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) . ' The first amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. ' The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted by the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor...." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
"E.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919) . i2E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) .
amples of restrictions imposed upon freedom of the press. Similarly, the fifth amendment's right against self-incrimination, 13 the "exclusionary rule"' 14 and, significantly, common law and statutory testimonial privileges for lawyer-client, 5 doctor-patient, 6 priest-penitent 17 and husband-wife 8 relationships all impair, to some degree. the efficiency and "truth-finding" function of the judicial system. The importance of a free press has been acknowledged since the beginnings of the Republic,' 9 but because no special training or licensing was needed to become a journalist, and because the journalist did not have a responsibility to provide individual assistance to specific clients, society, and the law did not vest the newsman with the same testimonial privilege given lawyers and doctors. No benefits were believed to derive from recognizing a confidential relationship between a reporter and his source that would justify a testimonial privilege for the reporter.
[lit has ... been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public... has a right to every man's evidence.
In general ... the mere fact that a communication was made in express confidence, or in the implied confidence of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege Although nineteenth century law did not recognize a newsman's privilege, confidentiality was seldom challenged in the courts and reporters, with little fear, made regular use of such sources. As journalism grew in professional stature and power during the twentieth century and the trend in print media swung toward more in-depth, investigative reporting, dependence on confidential sources increased."
1 Indeed, most newsmen recognized that some of their most important stories would never have been written without the aid of confidential sources.
22
The American Newspaper Guild acknowledged this important tool of newsgathering and recognized the responsibilities attendant to its use, when it adopted the first code of ethics for journalists in 1934. The code.included this provision: "Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential information in court or before judicial or investigative bodies." ' ss Still, the true test of reporters' resolve did not emerge until the late 1960's. It was during those years that governmental agencies turned to the press subpoena as a helpful and convenient means of gathering information about dissidents. Reporters resisted these subpoenas-and the clash between free press and judicial process ensued.
This, then, is the basic issue in the battle over newsman's privilege. It is a confrontation rooted in social mores and ethical values as well as law-and it is a conflict without any easy answers or simple solutions.
Ill. THE CONTROVERSIAL HISTORY OF THE NEws-

MAN'S PRIVILEGE
American journalists have been insisting for at least 130 yearsH that they should not be forced to reveal the identity of their news sources. This claim has been supported, at differing times, by one or more of four basic legal arguments.
21 See Blasi, The Newsmen's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 234, 252-53 (1971) .
22 See, e.g (1974) , which details use Washington Post reporters made of confidential sources in exposin%;he Watergate scandal.
American Newspaper Guild Code of Ethics, reprinted in G. BIRD *Common law. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, newsmen contended that such a privilege ought to be recognized in the common law, but that claim was rejected repeatedly by the judges writing the common law.s2 *Shield laws. Near the end of the century, the idea was first advanced that immunity for reporters could be secured through the enactment of state statutes-known today as shield laws-but it was* not until the 1930's that this proposal began making any real headway in state legislatures. More than half of the states now have shield laws, but courts generally have construed them quite strictly and thus often effectively have denied journalists their protection.2 *Fiflh amendment. In a limited number of cases where reporters have actually witnessed, or have direct knowledge of, criminal conduct on the part of their news sources, the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination has been invoked tojustify a newsman's refusal to testify. The fifth amendment theory is not used often, however, since it covers only a small number of the possible situations in which a reporter might wish to refuse to testify. 27 *First amendment. In 1958, it was suggested for the first time that the true foundation for a newsman's privilege might be found in the first amendment.' Twenty years later, the development of appellate doctrine indicates, that some degree of protection for the press is derived from the first amendment, but the scope of that protection has not yet been clearly defined.
A. THE COMMON LAW ARGUMENT
The earliest reported case involving a newsman who refused to reveal his sources is Exparte Nugent, 2 an 1848 decision. John Nugent, a reporter covering the United States Senate for the New York Herald, had obtained confidential documents concerning a proposed treaty to end the Mexican-American War. After the secret drafts appeared in print, the Senate subpoenaed Nugent and demanded that he reveal his source. He refused, and for his defiance was arrested for contempt of the Senate. Nugent then sought his freedom through a writ of habeas corpus. The Nugent opinion does not indicate whether any specific claim for a newsman's privi- 
19791
COMMENT lege was made before the court. If such an argument were made however, it apparently had no effect upon the decision for Nugent's arrest was upheld. The court rested its judgment on the inherent and sole power of the Senate to judge its own contempts'°T he gestation of the common law privilege doctrine can be seen more clearly in an 1857 legislative decision, also stemming from a congressional contempt citation. James Simonton, a Washington correspondent for the New York Times, had reported that several unnamed members of the House of Representatives had taken bribes in return for their votes on land grants in the Minnesota Territory."' A House select committee investigating the charges called the reporter to testify, but he refused to disclose the identities of either his source or the alleged bribetakers. In defense of his actions, Simonton told the committee: "I do not decline in order to screen the members; my declination was based upon my own conviction of duty.... I do not see how I can answer ... without a dishonorable breach of confidence. ' ' s 2 Apparently neither the committee nor the full House was impressed by Simonton's motives. A contempt citation was issued upon a 136-23 vote.33
The first case in which the highest court of a state was called on to resolve a claim of privilege was Pledger v. State a4 decided in 1886 by the Georgia Supreme Court. In Pledger, which was a prosecution for criminal libel, the court held that a newspaper publisher could not refuse to reveal the identity of a reporter who had written a story appearing in his newspaper. A defiant publisher would be subject to fines and imprisonment for contempt, as well as court-assigned liability for the libel.s3
In As indicated in Table 1 , the scope of the various shield laws varies dramatically.
43 Some states provide what is known as an "absolute" privilege: the journalist cannot be compelled to testify before any official body under any circumstances as to either his information or the sources from which he obtained that information. Prior to the Farber decision, New Jersey's shield law was believed to provide an absolute privilege.44 In recent years however, more states have tended to enact qualified shield laws. These statutes provide only limited protection and include exceptions for certain circumstances in which a reporter may be compelled to testify, such as libel actions, or instances where there is "an overriding public interest" in disclosure. Shield laws also tend to differ with regard to the persons who are permitted to claim their protection, whether both sources and information, or only sources are safeguarded, and when and how the privilege is waived.
The be an "absolute" reporter's shield law. Kentucky's highest judicial body, the Court of Appeals, conceded that the statute allowed a newsman to refuse to identify his news sources, but then held that the law did not apply when the reporter had actually witnessed the commission of a crime. When Branzburg's sources converted marijuana into hashish while he watched, the court held, they ceased 
1965
Publisher, editor, reNewspaper, magazine, (1974) porter, or other person other periodicals, press connected with or emassociation, wire service, ployed or formerly conradio, television nected with or employed
1973
Journalist, scholar, eduAny medium using facator, polemicist, or cilities for mass reproother persons either duction of words, principally employed in sounds or images to or spending 20 hours a general public week engaged in preparation or dissemination of information through mass reproduction to general public, or agent, assistant, employer, or supervisor of all of the above.
Yes
Applies Bridge, a reporter with the Newark News, spent 20 days in jail after he refused to answer a grand jury's questions about a bribe offer reportedly made to a state official. In his story about the incident, Bridge had named his news source, but had not revealed the identity of the person who had attempted to make the bribe. Bridge claimed the protection of the New Jersey shield law, but a superior court judge ruled he had waived the privilege by disclosing his source and some of the details in the story itself. A New Jersey appellate court and the U.S. 
D. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT
In 1958, actress Judy Garland sued the Columbia Broadcasting System for breach of contract and libel, basing her civil action on statements allegedly made by an unnamed network executive and appearing in a story by New York Herald Tribune gossip columnist Marie Torre. When the entertainer sought, through discovery proceedings, to learn the name of the executive, Torre refused to reveal it, and her attorneys responded instead with a novel argument that would significantly alter the scope of the newsman's privilege debate.
To compel a newspaper reporter to reveal the identity of confidential sources, they argued, would result in an unconstitutional encroachment upon the first amendment's guarntee of freedom of the press. This would occur because news sources' 50 236 U.S. 79 (1915) . There has been only one reported case of newsmen relying on the fifth amendment as a shield in recent years. A Massachusetts editor and reporter who were suspected of having obtained information from a grand jury leak pleaded both the first and the fifth amendments in response to a district attorney's questioning. A judge rejected the first amendment claim, but said the newsmen would not have to disclose their sources if it would tend to incriminate them. [Vol. 70
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awareness that their identity might later be disclosed would result in fewer informants revealing inside data to reporters and that, in turn, would lead to an overall reduction in the flow of news from press to public.
2
The argument did not succeed. Torre was held in criminal contempt for her refusal and the conviction was upheld upon appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 5 a Judge Potter Stewart declined to extend any explicit recognition to a privilege under the first amendment, though his opinion did make it clear that freedom of the press was an important right deserving some judicial protection:
[Fjreedom of the press, precious and vital though it is to a free society, is not an absolute. What must be determined is whether the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies some impairment of this First Amendment freedom .... If... freedom of the press ... is here involved, we do not hesitate to conclude that it ... must give place under the Constitution to a paramount public interest in the fair administration ofjustice.5 4 Judge Stewart noted that this was not a case where the judicial process was being used to force wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confidential. sources, nor was the news 'source's identity of doubtful relevance or materiality: "The question asked of the appellant went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim.
' ' O Miss Torre still would not testify, choosing instead to spend ten days in jail for contempt. Judy Garland, unable to learn the identity of the unnamed network executive, eventually dropped her libel suit.
56
The specific facts of the Garland litigation and the language of Judge Stewart's narrowly drawn opinion were seen initially as hopeful signs by many privilege advocates. They believed that the first amendment might provide a more substantial foundation for successful claims of protection in future cases. But that early optimism was not well founded. age to the first amendment-and then would proceed to rule that it provided newsmen no privilege. 7 On three different occasions prior to Branzburg, litigants sought Supreme Court review of lower court decisions that held against a first amendment newsman's privilege. In each instance, they were unsuccessful. 5 8 In 1970 however, in the widely publicized case of Caldwell v. United Statesas the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that New York Times reporter Earl Caldwell not only had a privilege not to reveal confidential information, but indeed could not even be required to appear before a federal grand jury when the government had proven no compelling need for his testimony and a lower federal court already had granted him a limited testimonial privilege. 6 0 The surprising Caldwelljudment, the first court decision to ever accept 6 A decision which both followed the Garland principle and, at the same time, discussed the various other cases that had subscribed to the "no privilege" approach was In Branzburg v. Hayes the High Court, in a fiveto-four decision written by Mr. Justice White, held that requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries did not abridge the first amendment freedom of the press. 6 3 The
Court held that reporters have the same obligation as any other citizen to respond to grand jury subpoenas and to answer questions relevant to investigations into criminal activity. 6 4 The Court also decided that the first amendment does not give rise to any testimonial privilege, either absolute or qualified, that would protect a newsman's agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his news sources, or incriminating evidence against them. 65 The Caldwell decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, while the other three lower court judgments were upheld.
6 6 All three of the newsmen involved, Paul Branzburg, Paul Pappas, and Earl Caldwell, had argued a position not unlike that raised by Marie Torre. They said that, in the course of gathering news, it 61 The other three cases incorporated in the Branzburg decision all involved rulings that denied the newsmen's claims to first amendment privilege. As mentioned in note 45 supra, Paul Branzburg was a reporter who wrote two series of stories, at differing times, about drug usage in Louisville and Frankfort, Ky. Each of these series resulted in subpoenas from grand juries in those communities. Branzburg refused to answer questions from either body about the identities of persons he had seen in possession of drugs, claiming privilege under both state law and the first amendment. at 690-91.
6 " Id. at 692.
6 Id. at 708-09.
is often necessary for a reporter to promise either not to identify his sources or not to reveal in print everything he knows about a subject. If a reporter is compelled to reveal this information to a grand jury, confidential sources will be deterred from furnishing further information and the free flow of news, protected by the first amendment, will be diminished.
6 7 Justice White's response to this argument did admit one small victory for the fourth estate-he conceded that the seeking out and gathering of news was entitled to "some" first amendment protection. He said that without such protection freedom of the press could be "eviscerated. 
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The fifth and deciding vote in the Branmburg decisions was added by Justice Powell, who, in a brief concurrence, emphasized what he saw as "the limited nature of the Court's holding."
70 Justice Powell urged a balancing approach to the issue. He echoed Justice White's promise that harassment of the press wvould not be tolerated and he said that a reporter who was called on to give information bearing only a remote relationship to the subject of investigation, or who had other reason to believe "his testimony implicates confidential relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement" could seek a protective order of court through a motion to quash. 71 He concluded:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions. 7
In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, urged recognition of a suant to subpoenas, but the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of news--men. Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make disclosure to newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative. It would be difficult to canvass the views of the informants themselves; surveys of reporters on this topic are chiefly opinions of predicted informant behavior and must be viewed in the light of the professional self-interest of the interviewees. 408 U.S. at 693-94.
Justice Stewart, in dissent, sharply criticized the majority opinion on this point: "We have never before demanded that First Amendment rights rest on elaborate empirical studies demonstrating beyond any conceivable doubt that deterrent effects exist .... " It. at 733 (Stewart, J., dissenting). conditional privilege for newsmen 73 This recognition would entail shifting the burden of proving whether the privilege applied in a particular case. Instead of the journalist attempting to convince a court that he should be granted a testimonial privilege, the initial responsibility would fall upon the government to demonstrate why the reporter should not be permitted to invoke that protection.
74
To meet this burden, Justice Stewart said the government should be required to prevail on a three-part test. It should have to (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of first amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information.' Justice Douglas, who focused his dissent on the Caldwell case, specifically proclaimed his view that a reporter has an absolute right under the first amendment to refuse to appear or testify before a grand jury.
78 Indeed, the Justice upbraided the New York Times for urging only a conditional privilege in its arguments before the Court; this "timid, watered-down, emasculated version of the First Amendment" which the Times offered was at odds with the Justice's view of the first amendment as an absolute.7
F.'THE POST-BRANZBURG PRIVILEGE Today, more than seven years after the Branzburg decision, trial and appellate courts and legal commentators are still attempting to decide just what the Court's opinion actually meant. Limited to its facts, of course, the holding required Earl Caldwell, Paul Branzburg, and Paul Pappas to appear and testify before grand juries, although none ever actually did so. 78 On the general question of newsman's privilege however, the holding was not so The primary concern of this comment is applications of newsman's privilege to criminal law. We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination. The administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order.
In each instance where a reporter is subpoenaed to testify, the courts would also be embroiled in preliminary factual and legal determinations with respect to whether the proper predicate had been laid for the reporter's appearance....
... [1in the end, by considering whether enforcement of a particular law served a "compelling" governmental interest, the courts would be inextricably involved in distinguishing between the value of enforcing different criminal laws. By requiring testimony from a reporter in investigations involving some crimes, but not in others, they would be making a value judgment that a legislature had declined to make .... The task ofjudges, like other officials outside the legislative branch, is not to make the law, but to uphold it.... 408 U.S. at 703-06.
Much of the post-Branzburg privilege litigation, however, has been civil. For that reason, a brief examination of recent cases dealing with civil actions is necessary in order to better understand trends in this field.
Civil Actions
A conditional privilege appears to be developing in the area of civil litigation, drawing support more from the limiting language of Branzburg than from the holding itself. Courts deciding civil actions have repeatedly pointed to both justice White's and Justice Powell's emphasis on the limited nature of the Branzburg decision. a S Justice Powell's apparent endorsement of a balancing approach is also cited, 8 6 along with the Garland judgment. 8 7 These two cases, neither of which granted a privilege on their specific facts, are thus employed now to sanction its creation. Even though courts have generally acknowledged the existence of a conditional civil privilege, the extent to which they allow its assertion depends upon the nature of the claim. Many of the civil suits brought in the wake of Branzburg have been actions for libel. In such cases, the Garland standard is generally applied and privilege claims are rejected when the identity of the sources goes to the "heart of the claim." When newsmen are not actual parties to the litigation, however, courts are much more reluctant to require disclosure. in Herbert should not be viewed as having rendered a major change in the law of privilege claims in libel actions. The 1977 Second Circuit decision which the Supreme Court reversed in Herbert had attempted to extend the first amendment privilege well beyond the bounds of previous cases to encompass protection of ajournalist's "thoughts, opinions and conclusions" during the editorial process. The plaintiff in the case, a controversial ex-Army officer, had not attempted to discover the identity of news sources or force disclosure of confidential information. Instead, through pretrial discovery, he sought to learn the defendant's "state of mind" during the production and editing of an allegedly libelous television program. The plaintiff contended he needed this information in order to establish "actual malice"-the standard for recovery demanded under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 9 ' The Second Circuit opinion noted that the defendant broadcaster already had submitted to an extensive deposition, which revealed everything he "knew, saw, said and wrote during his investigation." ' To require more would be to "strike to the heart of the vital human component of the editorial process" and would result in journalists being "chilled in the very process of thought.
' "s
Writing for a six-to-three majority, Justice White found that argument unpersuasive. He conceded suited in a national telecast that raised doubts about Herbert's veracity. Herbert then brought a $45 million defamation action against Lando, CBS, and others. Herbert's deposition of Lando filled 2,903 pages, produced 240 exhibits, and required 26 sessions over a period of a year. In the deposition, Herbert inquired about what Lando knew, whom he had interviewed, and the frequency of his communications with his sources. The plaintiff also wanted to know about the producer's beliefs, opinions, intent, and conclusions in preparing the program. Lando refused to answer only a few of these questions-those dealing with his thoughts and conclusions during his research, and his "state of mind" concerning the veracity of the persons he had interviewed. The Second Circuit felt that if malice was involved under the New York Times rule, note 91 infra, Herbert ought to be capable of proving it through the use of the massive transcript he already had compiled.
9' 376 U.S. 254 (1964) . The Herbert and Cervantes cases both involved "public figures" and, under the rules spawned by the New York Times case and its progeny, a public figure must meet a higher standard of proof in order to win his case. The public figure must demonstrate that the falsehood was published with actual malice or in reckless disregard of the truth. This standard may arguably provide courts with a greater justification for ordering disclosure, though the Eighth Circuit did not choose to do so in Cervantes.
9,2 568 F.2d at 984.
that the ediftorial process is entitled to some first amendment protection and said it could not be subjected to "private or official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve some general end such as the public interest." 94 But where there is a "specific claim of injury arising from a publication that is alleged to have been knowing or recklessly false," 95 no constitutional barrier exists. To hold otherwise, the Justice concluded, would be to "erect an impenetrable barrier" to a plaintiff's use of the sort of direct evidence most relevant to establishing "the ingredients of malice required by 1974) . This case involved a libel action brought by the general counsel of the United Mine Workers union against political columnist Jack Anderson and one 'of his associate writers. Anderson had relied on the observations of confidential sources in writing a story that charged the plaintiff with taking documents from the union's headquarters in order to thwart a government investigation into union financial affairs.
The Garland and Carey standard also was applied to another case in which columnist Anderson was involved, this time as a plaintiff. Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp.
(D.D.C. 1978).
Anderson was seeking damages and charging that a conspiracy led by former President Nixon had intended to deprive him of his rights as a journalist. During a pretrial deposition, Anderson refused to identify some of his confidential sources. In resolving the issue, Judge Gerhard Gesell began by describing the newsman's privilege as a" 'fundamental personal right' well founded in the First Amendment"-perhaps the most sweeping language yet used by ajurist in considering the issue. 444 F. Supp. at 1198. The judge went on to say, however, that the protection was qualified:
The qualified privilege ofthe newsman is a fragile one.... Where, as here, it is the newsman himself who has provoked the legal controversy about which his confidential sources may have relevant information, any "balancing" seems most unrealistic. Having chosen to become a litigant, the newsman is not exempt from those obligations imposed ... on all litigants in the federal courts. 444 F. Supp. at 1199.
COMMENT opinion, which he considered controlling in Branzburg, and then continued:
Branzburg, in language if not in holding, left intact, insofar as civil litigation is concerned, the approach taken in Garland. That approach essentially is that the court will look to the facts on a case-by-case basis in the course of weighing the need for the testimony in question against the claims of the newsman that the public's right to know is impaired.9 8
The court added the Garland "heart of the claim" test and a requirement that libel plaintiffs first make a reasonable attempt to exhaust alternative sources of information before seeking disclosure from the newsman-though such attempts did not have to be "wide ranging and onerous" when the number of potential sources was "very substantial." ' Applying those standards to the libel claim before it, the court concluded that the identity of the newsmen's sources was critical to the plaintiff's claim.
It While several federal and state courts seem to be acknowledging the existence of a conditional newsman's privilege in defamation cases, it bears mention that two state supreme courts have ruled in libel actions that no such protection, either absolute or qualified, is sanctioned by the first amendment. The Massachusetts Supreme v. Time, Inc., t decided just three weeks after Branzburg, the Eighth Circuit said it would not routinely grant motions for compulsory revelation of confidential sources "without first inquiring into the substance of the libel allegation."°2 Looking at the facts before it, the court said the plaintiff had produced "little more than a series of self-serving affidavits" to support his claim." t° The court concluded that to compel disclosure when a defamation plaintiff "has not produced a scintilla of proof" would constitute precisely the unjustifiable harassment of the press which Justice Powell had warned against in Branzburg. 10 4
In three other civil cases decided by federal circuit courts of appeal, journalists were not actually parties to the litigation and the courts ac- 966 (1973) . This case involved a civil rights class action brought on behalf of black home buyers against real estate agents who were alleged to have discriminated in their sales practices. The journalist who was deposed by the plaintiffs had written a story based on an interview with one real estate agent, but the information was given only after the reporter promised confidentiality. The reporter made it apparent during his deposition that he was sympathetic to the plaintiffs' cause, but he would not reveal his source.
Several cases on the federal and state levels have cited Baker for the proposition that newsmen are entitled to a qualified privilege and should not be required to disclose confidential sources when they are not parties to the civil litigation being contested. In Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) , a civil action arising out of the Watergate burglaries, representatives of President Nixon's Committee for the Re-Election of the President subpoenaed a large number of journalists from several major newspapers and newsmagazines for depositions and to obtain all of their notes, photographs, and tapes relating to the break-ins. In quashing the subpoenas, the court distinguished Branzburg as a criminal case, said the plaintiffs had not met the Garland "heart of the claim" test, and cited Baker as precedent for a qualified privilege.
Cases that have since adopted either the Steelhammer,'° though the court vacated the journalists' unserved sentence of six months in jail. The decision grew out of a civil contempt hearing held to determine whether members of a coal miners' union had violated a court order prohibiting wildcat strikes. Two reporters for the Charleston Gazette were held in contempt of court for refusing to testify about what they had seen or heard at a union rally. The convictions were initially reversed by the appellate court on the ground that the information could have been obtained from other persons who-had attended the rally," 0 but on a rehearing en banc, the contempt judgments were reinstated by a four-to-three vote. The full court adopted the reasoning of the dissenting judge in the-earlier case, who said that since the reporters admitted their information came not from confidential sources, but from an open meeting, they should be required to testify. action against an attorney who had provided a reporter with facts from which she had written a story about the plaintiff. Since the reporter was the only witness to what the lawyer had actually said, the Iowa court ruled the plaintiff had met what it defined as the three Garland, Baker, and Cervantes tests: (1) the information was necessary or critical to the involved cause of action or defense pleaded; (2) other reasonable means available by which to obtain the information sought had been exhausted; and (3) it did not appear from the record that the action or defense was patently frivolous.
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Grand Jury Proceedings
Grand jury proceedings were the context in which the four Branzburg cases arose and on the basic question of whether newsmen can be compelled to appear and testify before grand juries, Branzburg still controls. sources. Several reporters and editors have been held in contempt of court for refusing to identify their insider sources, but in one instance, a reporter's conviction was overturned after the court applied a balancing test to the case.12°A s to the scope of grand jury questioning, judges in at least two cases have suggested that the Branzburg holding has been augmented by the tests enunciated in Bursey.
2 ' That case involved two members of the Black Panther Party, Sherrie Bursey and Brenda Presley, who also worked as reporters and editors for the party's national newspaper. They were called several times to appear before a federal grand jury that was investigating an alleged threat on the life of President Nixon and rumored Black Panther interference with American military forces. During their grand jury appearances the government also sought to question Bursey and Presley about the operation and staff of the party's newspaper, but they refused to answer. The Ninth Circuit held that the questions dealing with threatened violence and the military interference were legitimate, but ruled the two women could not be compelled to testify about the publication and distribution of Black Panther newspapers or pamphlets because those inquiries violated the first amendment rights of free association and freedom of the press.I 2 2
The Bursey court did not conclude that journalists could never be questioned about their work, but it did hold that " [w] hen governmental activity collides with First Amendment rights, the Government has the burden of establishing that its interests are legitimate and compelling and that the incidental infringement upon First Amendment rights is no greater than is essential to vindicate its subordinating interests. 3Is
In the grand jury context, the court said the government would be unable to meet this burden unless it demonstrated that: the Government's interest in the subject matter of the investigation is "immediate, substantial, and subordinating," that there is a "substantial connection" between the information it seeks to have the witness compelled to supply and the overriding governmental interest in the subject matter of the investigation, and that the means of obtaining the In those cases where newspapers have published "leaked" reports of grand jury proceedings, courts normally have ordered disclosure of the confidential source, though even in this area of conceded judicial supremacy, judges have evinced some concern for the competing first amendment interest.
In a 1977 case involving the New York Times and the sealed results of a grand jury's investigation into the Internal Revenue Service's "Operation Leprechaun," involving alleged probes by IRS agents into the drinking and sexual habits of prominent taxpayers, a federal judge, while holding that "there is no constitutional right to withhold sources of grand jury leaks," did permit the disclosure to be made in camera. 12 5 A California appellate court ruled that a defendant's right to a fair trial justified sealing a grand jury report until after the completion of the trial, and outweighed a conditional first amendment privilege which it said was granted by Ct. App. 1976) . In that case, the court held that a journalist could claim a first amendment privilege to refuse to answer grand jury questions only if she could demonstrate that the questions were not relevant and material to a good faith investigation. In Tierney, the reporter was unable to satisfy that requirement. The New York Times also was involved in a similar case decided two years before Branzburg in In re Grand Jury, 315 F. Supp. 681 (D.Md. 1970) . The court held that while it had the power, under the first amendment, to inquire into the source of a grand jury leak of a sealed indictment that the Times had published, it did not feel such an action was warranted in this case because there was no indication that anyone under the court's direct authority was responsible for the leak.
'26 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975 464 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976 .
'2, Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975 ), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976 The one case that contradicts this general trend presented a factual situation that will not often be repeated. After investigating charges of local governmental corruption, a Florida grandjury decided not to hand down any indictments, though its report did criticize several city officials. Under that state's law, disclosure of such critical reports is forbidden until the unindicted persons have had time to file a motion to repress. A reporter who wrote a story revealing the grand jury's decision was found guilty of criminal contempt after she refused to disclose her source. However, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the persons criticized in the report, who might not have succeeded in suppressing the document in any case, were the only ones affected by premature disclosure. The court concluded that their interest did not outweigh the conditional privilege which it detected in Branzburg.' 2 8
Criminal Cases
As in the area of civil litigation, courts in criminal cases generally seem to be acknowledging the existence of a conditional or qualified privilege for the press. Most courts attribute the initial recognition of this privilege riality" are mentioned most often by judges. This means that in cases where a court feels that either the identity of a news source or the confidential information in a reporters possession is relevant and material to the guilt or innocence of the accused, or to the classification of the offense, it will deny the privilege claim and order the name or material disclosed.I t 2 If, however, the newsman's confidential information is only "collateral '' t3 3 or "tangential ' '134 to the case, the court will accept the first amendment argument and uphold the reporter's refusal to testify. This is another application of post-Branzburg "balancing" of privilege claims. We are of opinion that when there are reasonable grounds to believe that information in the possession of a newsman is material to proof of any element of a criminal offense, or to proof of the defense asserted by the defendant, or to a reduction in the classification or gradation of the offense charged, or to a together are easily recognized as a criminal trial variant on the first two disclosure criteria recommended by Justice Stewart in his Branzburg dissent.
1
' The Justice's third suggested requirement, demonstration of "a compelling and overriding interest in the information," has not been explicitly adopted in subsequent state criminal decisions, though the tone of several of the opinions suggests that such a standard is to be implied." 3 7
Most of the criminal cases involving privilege claims have been decided in state, rather than federal courts, and most of the original disclosure motions have been made on behalf of defendants who were seeking either the identity of witnesses or information for impeachment purposes. The Supreme Court of Virginia has said that:
The Sixth Amendment rights of a citizen accused of crime ... to "call for evidence in his favor" are rights of no less dignity than the right of the government to prosecute. Nor are society's demands that the privilege yield to the legitimate needs of law enforcement superior to the demands of due process that the privilege yield to the legitimate needs of the accused to defend himself.
38
It is worth noting, however, that defendants have had significantly less success than prosecutors in securing court orders for disclosure. In reported cases between 1972 and 1979,judges directed newsmen to turn over information to defendants in only four of seventeen instances, while the state won favorable rulings in four of five cases.' 38 Another decision requiring disclosure involved a court's ormitigation of the penalty attached, the defendant's need to acquire such information is essential to a fair trial; when such information is not otherwise available, the defendant has a due process right to compel disclosure of such information and the identity of the source; and any privilege of confidentiality claimed by the newsman must, upon pain of contempt, yield to that right. 214 Va. at 757, 204 S.E.2d at 431 (emphasis in original). This explanation drew upon the Supreme Court of Vermont's test in State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974) and was adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812 (1978) , cert. denied, -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 1265 Ct. (1979 der on its own behalf where the judge sought to learn the source of a "leaked" deposition.140 One commentator explaining the trend toward favoring prosecution requests noted that "Itihe fault lies not in deficient protection of the criminal defendant's interest, but in an overgenerous award of prosecutorial discretion in determining when compulsory disclosure of press confidences is warranted. ' 
14
' Another possible explanation for this pattern favoring the prosecution appears to lie in the "materiality" standard. Defense attorneys often seek evidence from newsmen that has little bearing on the actual guilt or innocence of their clients. When this occurs, courts have not been inclined to revoke the reporter's privilege.
In cases where either the defendant or the prosecution has sought information, notes, tape recordings, or video outtakes, courts occasionally have agreed to order disclosure when the identity of the source is known. The first post-Branzburg case to adopt this approach was United States v. Liddy.1 42 Alfred Baldwin, a member of the infamous White House "Plumbers Unit," had agreed to become a government witness against the Watergate burglars in return for a grant of immunity. Prior to trial, he gave an interview to reporters from the Los Angeles Times which resulted in several stories appearing in that newspaper. The defendants then subpoenaed "all papers, recordings and transcripts" of the interview, hoping to use them to impeach Baldwin's testimony at trial. The court noted that the newspaper was not seeking to protect the identity of any news source: "Mr. Baldwin's name is emblazoi~ed on the pages of the Los Angeles Times ... for the world to see. 143 The court then discussed the impact of Branzburg and concluded: "If impeachment evidence is available, it is critical that the defendants have access to it. If the 'striking of a proper balance' is required, as Mr. Justice Powell suggests, this Court will always strike the balance in favor of due process.' The opinion did not mention the materiality, alternative sources, or compelling need tests recommended by Justice Stewart. But the focus on the previous disclosure of the news source as a rationale for requiring the newspaper to turn over its information has been 140 See Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971 ), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972 Other judges however, have chosen to apply only the materiality or relevancy tests to situations where the source already was known and thus have ignored the Liddy approach.
14 6
In only one case prior to Farber did a defendant seek both a reporter's confidential notes and the identity of his source. That occurred in People v. Marahan, 147 a 1975 New York case in which the two defendants sought to impeach the testimony of police officers following an arrest for illegal possession of weapons. A county supreme court quashed subpoenas directed to a New York Daily News reporter, holding that the information sought was collateral to the question of guilt. The court held that requiring the reporter to divulge either the identity of the source or the information under such circumstances would violate his rights under both the first amendment and the New York shield law. 14 8
IV. THE COMPLICATED CASE OF MYRON FARBER
For Myron A. Farber, the trail that would lead him to his confrontation between journalist and jurist began in August 1975. Farber, a reporter with the New York Times since 1966, was assigned by his editors in August 1975 to follow up on a tip concerning a ten-year-old unsolved mystery, the suspicious, but never explained deaths of thirteen persons at a small hospital in Oradell, New Jersey.
14 9 Farber spent the next four months trying to piece' the puzzle together. Finally, on January 7 and 8, 1976, the results of his, investigation appeared in print.'5W In two dramatic front-page stories, Farber laid out a carefully researched case that strongly suggested a doctor on the hospital's See id., Jan. 7, 1976, at i, col. 1; id., Jan. 8, 1976, at 1, col. 5. surgical staff had murdered patients with injections of a muscle relaxant drug called curare. Because no official accusations had ever been brought concerning the deaths, Farber identified the physician only as "Dr. X."' 51 In the first of the "Dr. X" articles, Bergen County, New Jersey, prosecutor Joseph Woodcock announced the state had reopened its own investigation into the deaths. The evidence uncovered by that probe was presented to a grand jury. Farber was not called as a witness before the grand jury, nor were any of his notes subpoenaed.
5 2 On May 19, 1976, the grand jury indicted Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich, former chief of surgery at Riverdell Hospital, charging him with the murder by poisoning of five patients."ss The alleged motive was a desire to discredit other physicians on the hospital staff.
In November 1977, the defense counsel for Jascalevich submitted a list of his prospective defense witnesses, including Farber. 1 5 TheJascalevich trial began on February 27, 1978. A subpoena ad testificandum was served on Farber two days later and he appeared in court on May 24 to testify briefly, outside the jury's presence, about the access he had been given to the state's ten-year-old records on the Riverdell deaths. He declined, however, to answer questions about how he had obtained a copy of a previously missing deposition of Dr. Jascalevich, claiming the protection of the New Jersey shield law.1ss
This testimony did not satisfy defense counsel. The attorney insisted that he would have to see the entire file that Farber had amassed during his fourmonth investigation. According to the defense, the deaths had resulted from incompetent treatment provided by other doctors on the hospital staff. The charges against .Jascalevich, the lawyer argued, had been "concocted" by Farber and prosecutor Woodcock for "financial gain" and were part of a conspiracy "to advance their careers.""i This theory was based on three facts: 1w See note 149 supra.
Woodcock had given Farber permission to examine the state's files on the deaths; (2) Farber had discovered, during his research, a copy of the missing 1966 Jascalevich deposition and then turned it over to the prosecutor; and (3) Farber had signed a contract to write a book about the case. The defense argued that the conviction of Jascalevich would stimulate sales of the book and would thus enrich the reporter. 157 Farber had repeatedly denied any collusion with the prosecutor and also had insisted that there was nothing in his files that would prove either the defendant's guilt or innocence." But, because his files contained the names of persons who had been promised confidentiality in return for their agreement to be interviewed, Farber said he would not permit his notes to be examined.' 5 9 In May, in an ex parte action, the defense applied to the trial court for a subpoena duces tecum directed against Farber and the New York Times Co. The defense affidavit requested "all statements, pictures, memoranda, recordings and notes of interviews of witnesses for the defense and prosecution ... as well as information delivered to the Bergen County Prosecutor's office and contractual information relating to the above which are in the possession, custody or control of" Farber and the Times. 160 In effect, the defense was asking for everything Farber had compiled in the course of his investigation. The defense argued that Jascalevich would be deprived of his sixth amendment right to compel testimony and confront his accusers if Farber were not required to produce all the informa-
The trial court accepted the defense arguments and agreed to seek the subpoenas. Since Farber lived in New York State and his newspaper's principal place of business was there, it was necessary for the judge to issue a certificate of materiality under the Uniform Act to Secure May 31, 1978, to contest the application for the subpoenas. They argued that the defense affidavit provided insufficient legal grounds for the trial court's certificate of materiality and that the files sought were privileged under both the first amendment and the New York and New Jersey shield laws. 5 The New York court would not permit an offer of proof of these contentions" 8 an -three days later, issued the subpoenas duces tecum.6 5 The opinion accompanying the subpoena indicated that the responsibility for hearing Farber's substantive constitutional and statutory objections lay with the New Jersey courts which were bound to allow full faith and credit to the laws of New York to protect the statutory entitlements of New York citizens.'66
The order was appealed to the appellate division of the supreme court and then to Judge Fuchsberg of New York's highest judicial body, the court of appeals, but the court at both levels held that such an order could not be appealed under New York law."
8 The motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum had to be made in the court in which the subpoena was returnable-in this case, the New Jersey Superior Court.
Attorneys for Farber and the Times argued in the New Jersey Superior Court that the subpoenas should be quashed because (1) they were overbroad, especially in light of the first amendment considerations involved; (2) there had been no showing of materiality or necessity for the documents sought; and (3) Farber's files were protected from compelled disclosure by the Constitution and New York and New Jersey shield laws." The court refused to hear the appellants' arguments or rule on the merits of the motions to quash until it had an opportunity to examine the subpoenaed materials in camera. 5 One of the Times' attorneys on the case responded that submitting Farber's notes, even for an in camera inspection, would be "invading the very rights we seek to protect" because the judge, as a representative of the judiciary, was also Farber and the Times still refused to turn their records over to the court without a full hearing on the substantive challenges to the subpoena. An order returnable before a different Bergen County Superior Court judge was issued directing the appellants to show cause why they should not be held in criminal contempt of court for their failure to comply with the order to produce.1 7 4
During the initial hearing on the criminal contempt order, attorneys for Farber argued that the order had been served on him illegally in New York rather than New Jersey. The court then ordered the defense to apply to the trial court for an additional order to show cause in aid of a litigant.' 7 5 A failure to comply with this order "T Statement by Eugene Scheiman; N.Y. Times, July 7, 1978, § B, at 3, col. 3. 1' See State v. Jascalevich, No. S-495-76, oral opinion. on motion to quash subpoena duces tbcum (NJ. Super. ' Ct.June 30, 1978) . 1 2 See New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, -U.S.-, 98 S. Ct. 3058, 3060 (1978) . '73 -U.S.-, id. at 3059-60. Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, 332 (1978) . See also Brief for Appellants at 8-9. '17 Brief for Appellants at 8-9.
would mean an additional penalty for the appellants, this time for civil contempt of court. With this directive, the entire process began anew. Again the trial court issued a certificate of materiality directed to the New York County Supreme Court. The certificate included a provision, as required by the Uniform Witness Attendance Act, that "Myron Farber, upon coming into the State of New Jersey, will be given protection from arrest or service of process upon him, civil or criminal, as set forth in the New Jersey Statute Again without addressing the substantive issues, the supreme court ordered Farber to appear.177 Farber returned to New Jersey. While he was appearing in regard to the civil order in aid of a litigant, a deputy state attorney general sought permission to serve the earlier issued criminal contempt order. Although attorneys for the reporter argued that he was appearing pursuant to the requirements of the Uniform Witness Attendance Act and was immune from service under both the explicit language of the Act and the trial court's certificate, the judge still permitted the order to be served upon Farber. 1 7 8 On July 24, the Bergen County Superior Court found both Farber and the Times guilty of criminal and civil contempt. The newspaper was fined $100,000 for criminal contempt and Farber was sentenced to six months in jail and fined $1,000 for the criminal conviction. In an effort to compel production of the subpoenaed documents for Jascalevich, the court also ordered a civil contempt fine of $5,000 a day for the Times and another $1,000 for Farber. The reporter was sentenced to remain in jail until he complied with the civil order.
" a The jail sentence for criminal contempt would not begin until after Farber produced his files, and the time served for civil contempt would not be applied to the criminal sentence. Later that day, the appellate division of the superior court granted a stay of the criminal contempt orders, but denied a stay of the orders for relief of a litigant. Farber spent seven hours in jail July 24 and was freed only after a member of the state's supreme court ordered his release pending further consideration of the case.18°O n July 25, the New Jersey Supreme Court, by identical five-to-one votes, declined to stay the civil contempt conviction and denied a motion for direct certification, thus refusing to speed up the state appellate process. Thejustices did permit, however, a temporary stay so that once again, Farber and the Times could appeal to the United States Supreme Court. ' The case again went before Justice White. He declined to intervene. This time, the Justice cited not only Branzburg, but also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 82 apparently for the proposition that the press was not entitled to any special protection under the first amendment.
There is no present authority in this Court either that newsmen are constitutionally privileged to withhold duly subpoenaed documents material to the prosecution or defense of a criminal case or that a defendant seeking the subpoena must show extraordinary circumstances before enforcement against newsmen will be had. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes ... ; see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.... 18 The Times next took its appeal to Justice Marshall, but he also refused to intervene. The Justice expressed support on the merits for the positions taken by the appellants, but said they had not met the criteria for the granting of a stay since they had not demonstrated "a balance of hardships in their favor," nor had they shown that "the issue was so substantial that four Justices ... would likely vote to grant a writ of certiorari.'1 8 4
Justice Marshall did, however, express serious reservations about the way in which the case had been handled in the New Jersey courts. He noted that the appellants had been found guilty of contempt and sentenced without any hearing on the substantive issues raised by Farber and the Times. defense affidavit, asserting only a general need for the materials subpoenaed, did not provide an adequate factual basis upon which the trial court could have determined materiality, necessity, or relevance.' 8 9
Following the refusal of the Supreme Court justices, Myon Farber returned to jail on August 4.
On August 18, Farber turned over the incomplete and unedited manuscript of his book on the Jascalevich case to the trial court. The Times also surrendered all of the newspaper's files on the case. Farber indicated in a letter to ,the judge that he was making the manuscript available merely to disprove charges that he was profiteering from the murder trial and its release was not intended as a waiver of his right to protect his files.
t9° The newspaper's records only dealt with contractual arrangements which had been made public through other sources. 1 91 On August 30, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed to hear the reporter's case without prior review by the appellate division.'
92 Farber was freed after twenty-seven days in jail and the fines were stayed temporarily. Oral argument was heard September 5, and on September 21, the court announced its decision. By a vote of five-to-two, the contempt convictions of the newspaper and the reporter were upheld.' 93 The opinions in that case are examined and analyzed in the next sections of this comment.
Farber was to return to jail the next day, but Justice Stewart granted a temporary stay pending a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on a motion for certiorari. 94 Meanwhile, the Jascalevich trial was nearing a conclusion and defense counsel asked the Supreme Court to end the stay because the time for forcing compliance with the subpoena was running out. Without reaching any decision on whether it would hear the case, the Court vacated the stay. 19 ' In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied,  -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978) . 2 Myron Farber had spent forty days in jail, the second longest incarceration for a reporter claiming the protection of a newsman's privilege, but had never surrendered his confidential files.
V. WHAT THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
DECIDED
The New Jersey Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Farber case on September 5, 1978. Just sixteen days later, the seven-member court announced its decision, in four separate opinions.
01
Writing for a five-to-two majority, Justice Mountain announced that both the criminal and civil contempt judgments against Farber and the Times were to be upheld. The Court held that neither the first amendment nor the state's news media shield law would sanction Farber's refusal to turn over his files when a defendant's constitutional rights in a murder trial were at stake. outlined the journalist's argument that the gathering and dissemination of news would be "seriously impaired" without a press privilege to keep information and sources confidential, because informants would be less willing to confide in reporters. This would result in a "substantial lessening" of the flow of news on issues of public concern and the ensuing injury to the public interest would violate the first amendment's guarantee of a free press. 2 w The court rejected this argument. Referring to Branzburg, the opinion indicated that "[in our view the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly rejected this claim and has squarely held that no such First Amendment right exists." ' 4 Furthermore, the court emphasized that the Branzburg decision had since been "underscored and applied directly to this case by Justice White in a brief opinion filed.., upon ... his denial of a stay sought by these appellants."
' M
Having rejected the first amendment claim, the majority opinion suggested the press was not without first amendment protections, including the right "to refrain from revealing its sources except upon legitimate demand. Demand is not legitimate when the desired information is patently irrelevant to the needs of the inquirer or his needs are not manifestly compelling." 2 06 Farber and the Times had urged the court to consider Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg as supporting a balancing test under which the validity of subpoenas would be determined on a case-by-case basis. The New Jersey court rejected that approach:
The particular path that any Justice may have followed becomes unimportant when once it is seen that a majority have reached the same destination.
...
[W]e do no weighing or balancing of societal interests in reaching our determination that the First Amendment does not afford appellants the privilege they claim. The weighing and balancing has been done by a higher court. 07 Finally, the majority concluded, Branzburg must be binding here because "the obligation to appear at a criminal trial on behalf of a defendant who is enforcing his Sixth Amendment rights is at least as compelling as the duty to appear before a grand jury. 
The Shield Law and the Sixth Amendment
The court next addressed the claims raised under the New Jersey shield law. 2°9 The opinion noted that no shield law had been involved in the resolution of the Branzburg cases, but acknowledged that the state law invoked here was "said to be as strongly worded as any in the country.', 210 The court then emphasized that it was "abundantly clear" Farber and the Times came fully within the protection of the law and that "[vliewed on its face, considered solely as a reflection of legislative intent to bestow upon the press as broad a shield as possible to protect against forced revelation of confidential source materials, this legislation is entirely constitutional., 21 However, the shield law had to be examined in light of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 2 1 2 and article 1, paragraph 10, of the The opinion pointed out that the New Jersey state constitution contained "exactly the same language" on compulsory process as the federal constitution.
We interpret it [Article 1, paragraph 101 as affording a defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and other material for which he may have, or may believe he has, a legitimate need in preparing or undertaking his defense. It also means that witnesses properly summoned will be required to testify and that material demanded by a properly phrased subpoena duces necum will be forthcoming and available for appropriate examination and use .... We hold that Article 1, 10 of our Constitution prevails over this statute. The majority conceded that other unspecified testimonial privileges, whether derived from common law or statute, would appear to conflict with the same constitutional provision. The court ventured no further opinion on such privileges, but said it was confining its consideration to the media shield law only. 
Procedural Mechanism for Disclosure
Having determined that neither the first amendment nor the state shield law could shelter Farber from the subpoena's demands, the court next addressed the problem of procedural mechanisms for disclosure. Attorneys'for the Times had repeatedly insisted that their clients were entitled to a full hearing on the issues of relevance, materiality, and overbreadth of the subpoena before contempt penalties could be imposed. The court agreed that such a hearing was necessary, but said the appellant had "aborted" it by refusing to submit the subpoenaed materials for in camera inspection.
8
The majority saw the in camera examination in a completely different light than the Times. While the newspaper contended there must be a full showing and definitive judicial determination of need, relevance, and the absence of less intrusive means of obtaining the information prior to the trial judge's inspection, the state supreme court felt such a rule would "effectively stultify" the judicial criminal process.
2 9 The court maintained that in Despite this view, however, the court still agreed the appellants ought to be afforded a preliminary determination before being compelled to submit their materials for in camera examination. The court did not base this conclusion upon any first amendment considerations, but rather upon an "obligation to give as much effect as possible, within... constitutional limitations, to the very positively expressed legislative intent" manifested in the shield law.Y'
To meet this threshold determination, the court said a defendant seeking disclosure would have to satisfy the trial judge "by a fair preponderance of the evidence, including all reasonable inferences," that he had met the requirements of a three-part test. The defendant must show: (I) there was a reasonable probabiliiy or likelihood that the information sought was material and relevant to his defense; (2)" the materials could not be secured from any less intrusive source; and (3) the defendant had a legitimate need to see and use the information.2 This three-part test is derived from Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg.
m
The Farber court emphasized that its opinion was not to be taken as "license for fishing expeditions" in every criminal case, nor as permission for "indiscriminate rummaging" through newspaper files. 224 However, the majority concluded it still was unnecessary in this case to remand for a formal "threshold determination." ' 25 Instead, the court, operating under state rules that permitted it to exercise limited original jurisdiction for factfinding purposes," examined the record before it and ruled that there was sufficient evidence to meet its test. The majority noted that the Jascalevich case had been in progress eighteen weeks at the time the in camera inspection was challenged. The trial judge's knowledge of the issues and facts involved afforded a "more than adequate factual basis upon which to rest a conclusion" that the prerequisites established by the court had been fully met-even though he had not articulated them in the specific fashion prescribed by the court. 2 7 The majority found support for this conclusion in its review of the trial record and of documentation filed on behalf of defendant Jascalevich. Considered particularly significant was the trial judge's knowledge of the "close association" Farber had allegedly enjoyed with the prosecutor's office since before the indictment of the doctor. "This glaring fact of their close working relationship may well serve to distinguish this case from the vast majority of others in which defendants seek disclosure from newsmen in the face of the Shield Law."m The other three opinions in the case focused, for the most part, on this final procedural issue. Chief Justice Hughes, in a brief concurrence, conceded that it would have been better for the trial court to have made a formal threshold determination of the competing claims. But the trial court's failure to do so "should not be conclusive in the face of [appellants'] intransigence." ' B. DISSENTING OPINIONS Two dissenting opinions were filed. Justice Handler dissented "with misgivings" because he found himself in "substantial accord" with much of the majority's reasoning. He agreed with the Branzburg view that the existence of a newsman's privilege was not to be inferred from the first amendment and he also felt the state's shield law should not be interpreted as providing absolute or unqualified protection. In camera inspection of confidential materials might be necessary to settle a "legal tug of war," but, a remand should have been ordered in this instance because of "the inadequacy of the present record to justify" the contempt judgments.
z ° In his view, the certificates of materiality issued by the trial court disclosed some likelihood that some of the material sought was relevant, but yielded only "a bare conclusion" as to its necessity. Furthermore, they were silent as to alternative sources and "indifferent as to matters of overbreadth, oppressiveness and unreasonableness. Justice Pashman's dissent was more vehement, but still focused on the procedural issue and urged a remand so that the appellants might have a hearing on the merits of their objections.
The majority's assertion that appellants were indeed accorded a due process hearing prior to in camera inspection is simply without foundation in the record .... I find it totally unimaginable that the majority can even consider allowing a man to be sent to jail without a full and orderly hearing at which to present his defenses.2 Justice Pashman saw no need to deal with the appellants' first amendment claims because their claim of privilege under the state shield law was meritorious.2-' The statute was amended after the Supreme Court had announced in Branzburg that state legislatures were free to set their own standards as to testimonial privileges for the press. The new law was thus "New Jersey's response to the Court's invitation." It reflected the "legislature's judgment that an uninhibited news media is more important to the proper functioning of our society than is the ability of either law enforcement agencies, the courts or criminal defendants to gain access to confidential news data."2 -He concluded that the shield law granted journalists absolute immunity from disclosure, including in camera inspection. Courts were given no discretion to decide in an individual case that the societal importance of a free and robust press was outweighed by other interests. The "weighing and balancing" already had been done by the state legislature which had decided that the right to nondisclosure was paramount in every instance.= However, the justice conceded that no statute could be applied so as to abridge an individual's constitutional rights and so he too urged a remand for the purpose of a formal hearing. His opinion contained detailed recommendations as to the procedure that should be followed, including suggestions that the trial judge prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law at each stage of the proceedings and that all parties be permitted to appeal the judge's decisions, either as to the necessity for in camera inspection, or the release of information after the judge's examination.s 7 He stressed that throughout the entire process the trial court must "constantly keep in mind the strong presumption 2' Id. 343 (Pashman, J., dissenting). The procedures followed by the New Jersey and New York courts, taken as a whole, resulted in a significant deprivation of the constitutional due process protections to which Farber and the New York Times were entitled. Important distinctions may be drawn between Farber and other criminal cases involving claims of newsman's privilege.
When the New York County Supreme Court initially ruled on the application for subpoenas duces tecum sought against the reporter and his newspaper, the court made it clear that it was issuing the subpoenas with the full expectation, based upon the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings and the certificate of materiality submitted by the New Jersey trial court, that a full hearing would be held in the New Jersey court "at which all issues of privilege, statutory and constitutional, may be raised."
The New York court did not permit offers of proof as to the alleged insufficiency in law and fact of the certificate 2 40 since absent an abuse of discretion or evidence of arbitrariness on the part of the issuing judge, the court was bound to allow the certificate "full faith and credit.
'24 By the terms of the Act, the certificate of the requesting state was prima facie evidence of the materiality and need alleged therein.
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The New York appellate courts refused to review the order because under state law, the motion to quash the subpoenas has to be made iii the court The Supreme Court, in a narrow holding, ruled that the Act was not unconstitutional on its face and upheld its application in the particular case, in part, because of the stringent procedural safeguards it was designed to provide. 
THE FALLACY OF FARBER
to which the subpoenas are returnable 24 a-even if that means an appearance in a court outside the state. Since Hackensack, New Jersey, was just across the state line, the court concluded there would be no inordinate hardship involved in requiring Farber to seek his relief there.
Unfortunately, the expectations of the New York judges who ordered Farber and the Times to comply with the subpoenas were never realized. Farber and the Times were never permitted to brief or to argue the substantive challenges to the subpoenas.
To satisfy the requirements of due process, the appellants were entitled to, and should have been granted, "a full hearing on the issues of relevance, materiality and overbreadth of the subpoenas."2" No one on any side of this conflict ever questioned that conclusion. Farber and the Times continually sought such a hearing. The New York judges assumed they would receive it. Justice Marshall emphasized its necessity in his August 4th ruling on the Times' application for a stay. 245 The state attorney general charged with prosecuting the criminal contempt judgment on appeal also acknowledged the obligation in his appellate division brief and in his oral argument before the New Jersey Supreme Court. 6 Both dissenting New Jersey justices argued that the denial of a hearing was violative of fourteenth amendment due process rights. 247 Indeed, the majority opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the trial court had a responsibility to conduct such a hearing, but concluded that the newspaper and its reporter had waived their right to the hearing by refusing to turn the subpoenaed files over for in camera inspection. 24 That judgment was in error.
The issue in dispute was not whether such a hearing was required, but when it had to be held. Five members of the New Jersey Supreme Court did not believe that it was necessary to conduct the hearing until after the trial judge had been given the opportunity to examine Farber's files privately in chambers. That conclusion, however, disregards a crucial component of the due process problem since one of the issues being contested, prior to an in camera inspection, was the legitimacy of, and necessity for, that very in camera inspection. The language of the New Jersey shield law, taken on its face, left no question that Farber and the Times were protected from forced disclosure not only to the defendant, but to the trial judge as well.
2 9 Due process required resolution of these claims prior to an order to produce and certainly prior to the imposition of penal sanctions. Even the attorney general in his brief admitted that "the wording of [the shield law] would indicate that the court of first impression should determine the applicability of the rule, including a lack of waiver, before ordering production, even in camera, of all documents or items subpoenaed." ' The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the argument because requiring a hearing before in camera inspection might "stultify the judicial criminal process since it is not rational to ask a judge to ponder the relevance of the unknown." 251 In so doing, the court ignored the important role the legislature plays, not only in enacting the laws that define and prohibit criminal conduct, but-also in establishing the rules and guidelines that govern the adjudication and punishment of crime. The passage of shield laws for the press, or the establishment of testimonial privileges to protect other relationships, is a legitimate and constitutional exercise of legislative power and represents a prior balancing of societal interests with the resulting conclusion that the public benefits derived from the privileged relationship outweigh the impact of a restraint upon the judicial process. Furthermore, as post-Branzburg cases have clearly demonstrated, the trial judge is not required to "ponder the relevance of the unknown" in conducting a predisclosure hearing. 
1979]
held that the initial responsibility for showing that disclosure of a newsman's sources or confidential information is necessary lies with the party seeking the disclosure-in this instance, with defendant Jascalevich. It was he who should have been required to narrow the focus and indicate to the court some logical and reasonably specific grounds for believing that the reporter had information that was material, relevant, unavailable from alternative sources, and compelling. The vague, essentially conclusory affidavits submitted by Jascalevich's attorney did not meet these standards. At a hearing a newsman also would be able to submit evidence, thus providing the judge with additional information upon which to base his decision. Then, if the party seeking disclosure has not met his burden, the trial court would be justified in assuming that the request for revelation was nothing more than a "fishing expedition" and was not sufficient to warrant an abridgement of rights under the first amendment or legislatively enacted shield protection. This is a far cry from "pondering the relevance of the unknown." Indeed, it is the balancing test given birth to in Justice Powell's Branzburg concurrence and nurtured by a dozen courts since then.ms
The New Jersey Supreme Court did recognize the necessity for this sort of threshold determination, but held that the test would apply to "those who in the future may be similarly situated", 259 -but not Farber and the Times. Instead of remanding the case and ordering a full determination of the constitutional and statutory issues involved, as both the Times and the state attorney general had recommended," the court invoked its original jurisdiction for the limited purpose of making findings of fact necessary to the disposition of the case. By so doing, the justices deprived the Times of notice, of any opportunity for response through briefing, and of any chance to present evidence or witnesses or to cross-examine defense witnesses-
• See, e.g., United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, '2r Remand brief for Attorney General at 12. Reply brief for Appellants at 13. all possible abridgements of due process. The majority's "fact-finding" was nothing more than a dependence upon the conclusions of the trial judge based "solely" on his "examination of a handful of newspaper articles" 26 ' and "conclusory allegations" "taken substantially verbatim" from the brief for defendant Jascalevich. '2 ' Another due process concern not even addressed by the New Jersey court was the manner in which Farber was served with notice of the criminal contempt charge. Interpretation of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings is beyond the scope of this comment. But in light of the due process problems in this case, it bears noting that Farber was originally served with notice of the criminal contempt charge in New York. At a later hearing in the New Jersey Superior Court, Farber's attorneys argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over him because the order to show cause had been served outside New Jersey. The court then ordered Jascalevich's counsel to seek an order in aid of a litigant and to pursue this remedy in New York under the Uniform Witness Attendance Act. Under both the language of that statute, 2 " and the court's certificate of materiality in aid of a litigant, Farber was promised immunity from service of criminal process while he was in New Jersey. Acting upon those assurances, a New York Supreme Court justice on July 18 ordered Farber to respond to the civil contempt proceeding that had been initiated in Jascalevich's behalf. And yet, while Farber was in the New Jersey courtroom later that same day, the trial court allowed service upon Farber in the criminal contempt matter, even though he protested that he was in New Jersey only under compulsion and should be immune from service. The attorney general argued that the civil and criminal proceedings were so intertwined that Farber's pres-262 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d at 347 (Pashman, J., dissenting). If a person comes into this state in obedience to a summons directing him to attend and testify in this state he shall not, while in this state pursuant to such summons, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this state under the summons.
